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We propose a robust risk management approach to deal with the problem of catastrophic climate changethat incorporates both risk and model uncertainty. Using an analytical model of abatement, we show how
aversion to model uncertainty influences the optimal level of mitigation. We disentangle the role of preferences
from the structure of model uncertainty, which we define by means of a simple measure of disagreement across
models. With data from an expert elicitation about climate change catastrophes, we quantify the relative importance
of these two effects and calibrate a numerical integrated assessment model of climate change. The results indicate
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driver of optimal abatement and that model uncertainty warrants a higher level of climate change mitigation.
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1. Introduction
This paper applies recently developed tools from deci-
sion theory and expert assessment data to discuss
abatement strategies in the case of climate change
under deep uncertainty. We distinguish the notion of
risk, which characterizes situations in which probabili-
ties of a random event are perfectly known, from the
broader notion of (Knightian) uncertainty (also called
ambiguity), which characterizes situations in which
some events do not have an obvious, unanimously
agreed upon probability assignment (Ghirardato et al.
2004).1 More specifically, we focus on the notion of
model uncertainty that corresponds to situations in
which different data-generating mechanisms or models
are considered as possible or plausible by the decision
maker (DM). Throughout the paper, we consider the
notion of model taken in its statistical sense, meaning
that it is defined as a probability distribution over a
sequence (or, here, over states of the world). Different
models may exist, for example, because too little infor-
mation is available, because different predictions exist
(depending on different data sets, different techniques,
etc.), or because the decision is based on the advice of
1 This definition comprises the definition of deep uncertainty given
by Lempert et al. (2006). In this paper, we use the terms “Knightian
uncertainty,’’ “ambiguity,’’ and “deep uncertainty’’ interchangeably.
experts who provide different assessments of proba-
bilities for a given event (as will be the case in our
application). We present the risk management problem
as an intertemporal problem of optimal abatement
under the possibility of a catastrophic climate event.
As is the case with a vast range of economic problems,
the climate change case illustrates particularly well a
situation in which the probabilistic model is neither
explicitly given nor can it be perfectly approximated or
inferred with the available data and current scientific
methods. Choosing among different climate policies in
this situation is therefore essentially an exercise in risk
management that has to be performed in a situation of
deep uncertainty (Kunreuther et al. 2013). Therefore,
it requires a robust decision-making approach that is
less sensitive to initial assumptions, is valid for a wide
range of futures, and keeps options open (Lempert
and Collins 2007), rather than a formal approach that
maximizes the expected utility mechanically.
More than ever before, it is now widely believed
that our entire planet is undergoing climate change,
and that this change is largely due to human activities
(IPCC 2013). What is less clear is how this process,
which is taking place over a very long time horizon,
will unfold. Based on the available observations and on
the current state of knowledge, scientific experts have
constructed models in order to simulate and quantify
1
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the impact of human activity on the climate system
and vice versa. However, a large degree of uncertainty
surrounds these models. These uncertainties arise from
both the underlying climate science (and the extreme
complexity of the climatic system) and our inability to
perfectly capture the way our socioeconomic system
would respond and adapt to climate change (Heal
and Millner 2014). This is particularly the case when
we consider situations with potential catastrophic
consequences, such as the collapse of the Atlantic
thermohaline circulation or the melting of the Antarctic
ice sheet. Such catastrophic events have not been
encountered in recent history,2 and their likelihood of
occurrence is therefore extremely difficult to assess.
From a decision maker’s perspective, becoming aware
of such occurrences leads to the expansion of the
set of admissible states of the world. Therefore, the
state space and the associated probabilities need to
be adjusted for making decisions when considering
such “unforeseen events” (Karni and Viero 2013). In
recent years, a few studies have been undertaken to
estimate these probabilities, consisting generally of
experts’ assessments.3 Since climate science is currently
unable to determine which of these estimates is the
best or what the best combination of them is, and
since these uncertainties are expected to persist even
when better scientific models become available,4 a
decision maker confronted with this situation would
find himself in a situation of model uncertainty rather
than risk.
In view of this disagreement among experts or mod-
els, how should a rational policy decision maker pro-
ceed? If one follows the traditional Bayesian/subjective
expected utility approach, one will simply aggregate
the models by averaging them into a single represen-
tative model and then use the (subjective) expected
utility framework (Newbold and Daigneault 2009). The
problem with this approach is that the decision maker
considers the resulting aggregated model in exactly
the same way as one would consider an equivalent
objective model representing a specific risk, and model
2 These phenomena have been referred to as “tipping elements”
because they imply abrupt climate change occurring “when the cli-
mate system is forced to cross some threshold, triggering a transition
to a new state” (Lenton et al. 2008, p. 1786). The corresponding
critical point at which the future state of the system is qualitatively
altered is called a “tipping point.”
3 Remark that these experts’ assessments may be the result of using
different climatic models, different physical parameters, different
methodologies, or different databases.
4 Even if climate scientists have recently made a great deal of progress
in understanding and describing the physical mechanisms involved
in the climate change phenomenon, many uncertainties still remain.
Some of them will eventually be resolved with future scientific
progress, whereas others may be in the realm of “unknowable”
(Pindyck 2013a) or “unquantifiable” (Heal and Millner 2014).
uncertainty has therefore no impact on the decision-
making process. This approach has, however, been
seriously challenged in situations of deep uncertainty.
The most famous example is that of Ellsberg (1961),
who showed through different experiments that the
choices of individuals cannot be rationalized under the
traditional Bayesian expected utility paradigm, and that
individuals usually manifest aversion toward situations
in which probabilities are not perfectly known. In
applied economic models, some recent contributions
have started to apply nonexpected utility frameworks
(i.e., alternative models of risk preferences and beliefs,
most of which replace the expected utility formulation
with alternative criteria) to the problem of climate
change. In particular, these include applications of
the smooth ambiguity model by Lange and Treich
(2008), who provide comparative statics results of the
role played by ambiguity in a simple two-period para-
metric model, and Millner et al. (2013) and Lemoine
and Traeger (2014), both of whom propose numeri-
cal models under ambiguity aversion. Other contri-
butions include applications of the macroeconomic
technique of robust control (Hansen and Sargent 2008)
by Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas (2012), who con-
sider an analytical pollution control problem, and by
Rudik (2016), who applies the concept in an integrated
assessment model (IAM) including learning.5 Finally, a
different approach is taken by Drouet et al. (2015), who
use the results of the most recent assessment of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to
numerically disentangle model uncertainty and risks
about mitigation costs, climate dynamics, and (continu-
ous) climate damages. For what concerns the inclusion
of catastrophic damages into integrated assessment
models, our paper also extends the work of, among
others, Gjerde et al. (1999), who show that taking into
account a risk of catastrophe provides a rationale for
current emission control, and Keller et al. (2004) and
Lontzek et al. (2012), who model a collapse in ocean
circulation as a permanent shock to the production
function, and show that the optimal policy should be
associated with immediate limitations on emissions.
In this paper, we take a step further in the direction
of understanding the theoretical mechanisms underly-
ing the results obtained in this literature, by applying
the most recent robust tools developed in decision
theory (Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2013b, Marinacci 2015).
We consider an alternative to expected utility models
that allows us to incorporate both risk and model
uncertainty. More specifically, we study the impact
of model uncertainty aversion on optimal abatement
policy. Our contribution is severalfold. We develop
5 Note that the preferences used by Hansen and Sargent (2008) can be
seen as a special case of the smooth ambiguity preferences. In their
case, the ambiguity function is of the exponential or constant absolute
ambiguity aversion type (Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2011, Marinacci 2015).
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a two-period model of emission abatement with an
endogenous probability of catastrophic climate change,
which allows us to disentangle the contribution of pref-
erences and the structure of model uncertainty on the
level of first-period abatement. We show that a simple
measure of the disagreement across models or experts
is a sufficient statistic for determining the structure
of model uncertainty that matters for abatement. We
apply our theoretical results using an actual assessment
of a major catastrophic climatic event with data from a
recent expert’s elicitation. Finally, we extend a widely
used integrated assessment model (IAM) of climate
change (dynamic integrated climate–economy (DICE)
model; Nordhaus 1993) to include a tipping element
in the climate response, in a framework where well-
defined probabilities are unknown. This allows us to
quantify the impact of deep uncertainty on the optimal
level of emission abatement, addressing one of the crit-
icisms of IAMs, which have been recently highlighted
by Stern (2013), Pindyck (2013a, b, 2015), and Kun-
reuther et al. (2013). Our broader finding is that in most
situations, a robust climate strategy implies stronger
mitigation policies. In that sense, we show that deep
uncertainty cannot be taken as an excuse for inaction,
making a clear link to the precautionary principle.6 We
show that both preferences over model uncertainty,
measured by ambiguity prudence, and the structure of
the model uncertainty, measured by the decrease of the
degree of model disagreement in abatement, determine
the optimal abatement level. The data we use from
expert elicitations indicate that it is the latter effect
that is by far the most important, given that the dis-
agreement across models or experts increases in global
mean temperature.7 Finally, the reformulated integrated
assessment model allows the generation of quantitative
estimates of the impact of risk and model uncertainty
aversion on optimal emission reductions. Compared to
the commonly used expected utility framework, model
uncertainty raises abatement significantly. Our broader
policy result corroborates the findings of the recent
strand of research that has emphasized the importance
of deep uncertainty and tipping points in quantitative
climate policy making (Lemoine and Traeger 2014;
Lontzek et al. 2012; Gjerde et al. 1999; Weitzman 2012,
2009; van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 2014; Lempert and
Collins 2007; Drouet et al. 2015).
6 The precautionary principle states that “When an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships
are not fully established scientifically” (Science and Environmental
Health Network 1998).
7 Climate data allow the prediction of a low level of future warming
with more confidence than a high level of warming, as mentioned
by Allen and Frame (2007, p. 582) who write, “once the world has
warmed by 4C, conditions will be so different from anything we can
observe today that it is inherently hard to say when the warming will
stop.”
Our results can be read in both positive and nor-
mative terms. Although we recognize the existence of
a debate about the normative status of nonexpected
utility models, and the predominance of the expected
utility theory paradigm for normative purposes in
decision making, we here follow the claim that there
is nothing irrational about violating Savage’s (1954)
axioms in situations of deep uncertainty (Gilboa et al.
2008, 2009, 2012; Gilboa and Marinacci 2013).8 The
non-Bayesian framework we adopt is thus compatible
with a normative assessment of optimal policies.
2. A Simple Model of Optimal
Abatement Under Model Uncertainty
To investigate the effects of different types of uncer-
tainty on emission abatement decisions, we construct
a simple economic model of optimal abatement with
two periods: today and the future. During the first
period, the decision maker chooses a level of abate-
ment a that is undertaken at cost c4a5. This abatement
reduces available disposable income in such a way that
consumption in period 1 is given by C1 =w1 − c4a5,
where w1 is the level of income of the first period. In
the future, there are two possible categories of states
of the world. One is catastrophic: the environment
is severely affected so that the consumption in the
second period C2 is given by w2 −Ls , where w2 is the
deterministic exogenous income, and Ls is the damage
(loss) that occurs with probability s, conditionally
on the fact that a catastrophe occurred (i.e., ∀ s ∈ S,
where S represents those catastrophic or unfavorable
states). The other is one in which no catastrophe occurs,
so that consumption is w2 (i.e., favorable state). The
probability p4a5 that such a catastrophic event will
occur is endogenous and depends on the level of abate-
ment chosen in the first period.9 Consumption in the
second period can therefore take S+1 different values,
and the abatement effort in the first period is the only
choice variable in this model. It is conceptualized as an
investment to reduce the risk of a catastrophic event
that is difficult to compensate by ordinary savings
(rather than an instrument used to optimally smooth
consumption over time). As in most environmental
8 In situations where information is scarce, alternative decision-
theory models may, on the contrary, perform better in the sense that
they have better explanatory power or are able to provide better
predictions and guidelines.
9 This type of model, with endogenous probability to model mitiga-
tion, is referred to as a “self-protection model’’ in the risk literature.
An alternative is to consider the case of adaptation or self-insurance
in which the loss in the second period depends on the abatement
level. Given the limited scope for adaptation in reducing catastrophic
impacts, we decided not to consider the latter case in this paper. It
can, however, be shown that our main results hold and would even
be reinforced by the presence of adaptation to the catastrophe or
standard continuous damages in our framework (Berger 2015).
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economic models under uncertainty, intertemporal
utility is assumed to be time separable, and future
utility is discounted by a factor  ∈ 40117.
Model uncertainty is introduced by relaxing the
assumption that all the elements of the maximization
program are objectively known or commonly agreed
upon, so that the probability model over future con-
sumption is no longer unique. We assume that a true
climatic process is in place and generates observations,
but that this true process and the probability model
representing it are unknown to the decision maker. The
observations generated by this model are, however,
available and used by experts (scientists, climatologists,
physicists, etc.) to construct predictive models that
belong to a class M . The true process is assumed
to belong to this class of models, and elements of
M are interpreted by the DM as possible alternative
models that could be selected by nature to generate
observations. These possible models have a “Waldean’’
interpretation in the sense that the class M is regarded
as a datum of the decision problem (Wald 1950). This
implies that the models have to be consistent with
objectively available information (note, however, that
the information must be incomplete; otherwise M
would be a singleton). This set therefore contains all
the information the DM considers as “credible” in the
sense that “states that are not given any weights by
any of the relevant probability distributions are simply
irrelevant” (Gajdos et al. 2008, p. 34). We assume that
there are n different models (or experts). These different
models P are indexed by a parameter  ∈ 81121 0 0 0 1 n9,
so that M = 8P9∈8110001n9. Each P describes a possible
distribution (i.e., a possible risk) of second-period con-
sumption: C˜24a1 5 (in what follows, only the probability
of catastrophe will depend on ). We also assume that
the decision maker has a prior probability measure over
the set of possible models; that is, ˜ has a probability
distribution q = 4q11 q21 0 0 0 1 qn5, so that ˜ takes value 
with probability q. This second-order distribution ˜
reflects model uncertainty in the sense that the DM
does not know which of the models P is the true
or the most accurate one and associates a subjective
weight q with each of them.10
In what follows, we consider different criteria for
decision making under climate model uncertainty,
and compare them in terms of optimal abatement.
In Appendix B, we discuss the case of uncertainty
about the economic impacts of a climate catastrophe
10 As mentioned earlier, a parallelism can be made between the
uncertainty that follows this decomposition into model (or epistemic)
uncertainty and risk (also called aleatory or physical uncertainty)
and what is generally referred to in the decision theory literature
as ambiguity (i.e., situations in which “a decision maker does not
have sufficient information to quantify through a single probability
distribution the stochastic nature of the problem he is facing” (Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. 2013a, p. 975).
(i.e., the size of Ls), showing that our results carry over
(and are even strengthened) in this case. Although
different existing models of ambiguity aversion could
have been adapted to the presence of objective infor-
mation (Marinacci 2015), we focus on the smooth
model of model uncertainty aversion for its ability
to characterize the notion of ambiguity neutrality, its
mathematical convenience, and because it encompasses
many of the alternative criteria as special or limit cases.
Nonetheless, we explore alternative criteria, such as
maxmin, in the online supplemental material (available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2365), showing
that they entail qualitatively similar results.
The traditional approach for addressing a problem in
which the true distribution is unknown is to consider
that agents use their probabilistic beliefs over the source
of uncertainty in an expected utility maximization
framework. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2013b) are the first to
provide a decision theoretic derivation of this type of
deep uncertainty presented in two layers. In particular,
they enrich the standard Savage framework (Savage
1954) in the presence of objective information, and show
that preferences satisfying Savage’s axioms may be
represented, in the context of our abatement model, by
WSEU = v4w1 − c4a55+EEv4C˜24a1 ˜550 (1)
In this expression, v is the per-period von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility function reflecting both the decision
maker’s attitude toward risk and desire to smooth
consumption over time;11 E is the expectation opera-
tor taken over prior distribution ˜, that is, EX4˜5=∑n
i=1 qiX4i5; and E is the expectation operator over
second-period consumption in the different states of the
world, conditional on model . This representation is
called classical subjective expected utility (SEU) because
it incorporates key objective pieces of information in
Savage’s subjective framework. In the context of this
paper, the second-period expected utility for a given
model  may be written as
Ev4C˜24a1 55 ≡ p4a15
∑
s∈S
sv4w2 −Ls5
+ 41 − p4a155v4w251 (2)
where we denote by p4a15 the probability of catas-
trophe as a function of abatement for model . For
each prior distribution q, there exists an equivalent pre-
dictive distribution C˜24a1 ¯5 such that EEv4C˜24a1 ˜55=
Ev4C˜24a1 ¯55, and it is therefore clear that the reduced
form of representation (1) is nothing but the original
11 The two features could easily be disentangled using Kreps and
Porteus (1978) and Selden (1978) preferences. For the sake of exposi-
tional clarity and simplicity, we only consider this specification in
the quantification part of the paper (see §4).
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“Savagian’’ subjective expected utility. The decision
problem under uncertainty is then reduced to a simple
decision problem under risk where the beliefs are
subjective. On the other hand, when M is a singleton
(i.e., when there is only one model everyone agrees on),
there is no longer model uncertainty, so that the risky
second-period consumption is C˜24a5 and we are back
to the classical von Neumann–Morgenstern expected
utility model. These different representations of the
problem are observationally equivalent to someone who
is not aware of the presence of objective information
deriving from different experts’ models.
In what follows, we consider the subjective expected
utility representation as a benchmark. The economic
problem of finding the level of abatement a∗SEU that
maximizes program (1) is easy to solve.12 This level is
implicitly given by equalizing the marginal cost and
benefit of abatement:
v′4w1 − c4a∗SEU55c′4a∗SEU5= −
¡EEv4C˜24a∗SEU1 ˜55
¡a
0 (3)
Although the classical subjective expected utility
framework has the advantage of being easily tractable,
it is unable to take into account different attitudes
toward different types of uncertainty that surround
the economics of climate change. We now introduce
different attitudes toward different types of uncertainty.
To investigate the relationship between risk aversion
and model uncertainty aversion, we consider a crite-
rion in which the function representing the agent’s
preferences toward model uncertainty is smooth and
hence everywhere differentiable. By letting v represent
attitude toward risk and h represent attitude toward
model uncertainty, we can write the smooth criterion
(Marinacci 2015) to be maximized as
WSmooth = v4w1 −c4a55
+4vh−154E4hv−154Ev4C˜24a1˜55550 (4)
This expression can be written equivalently as
WSmooth = v4w1 − c4a55+v4CE4ce4a1 ˜5551 (5)
where ce and CE both represent a certainty equivalent:
ce4a15≡ v−14Ev4C˜24a1 55 and
CE4ce4a1 ˜55≡ h−14Eh4ce4a1 ˜550
(6)
The first, ce4a1 5, corresponds to the certainty equiva-
lent of wealth in the second period, if the abatement
12 The maximization programs we consider in this paper are assumed
to be convex. Sufficient conditions for concavity of (1) are that the
cost function is increasing (c′4a5 > 0) and convex (c′′4a5 > 0) in the
level of abatement, and that the probability function is decreasing
and convex (p′4a5 < 0, p′′4a5 > 0). More generally, sufficient conditions
for concavity of (4) may be found in Proposition 3 in Berger (2015).
level is a and the expert’s model considered is P.
Under model uncertainty,  itself takes on different
values, and so does the certainty equivalent ce4a15,
which is computed conditionally on . A second-order
certainty equivalent of these first-order certainty equiv-
alents is then defined as CE by combining all models
 ∈ 81121 0 0 0 1n9. The SEU representation (1) is then
obtained in the special case in which the two certainty
equivalents are evaluated using the same function v,
so that the attitudes toward risk and model uncertainty
are exactly the same.
The smooth model uncertainty criterion is mathe-
matically equivalent to the two-period version of the
ambiguity model developed by Klibanoff et al. (2009).
The significant difference is that their model, as the vast
decision theoretic literature dealing with ambiguity
(see Gilboa and Marinacci 2013 for an excellent sur-
vey), has been developed in a purely subjective setup
and therefore does not explicitly incorporate objective
information à la Wald (1950). In particular, their repre-
sentation is recovered by letting ≡ h  v−1 represent
the ambiguity attitude. Klibanoff et al. (2005) associate
 being a concave function to ambiguity aversion and
call the ratio −4′′4x5/′4x55 the coefficient of absolute
ambiguity aversion at x, a given level of expected
utility. From representation (4), ambiguity aversion
would correspond to h being more concave than v or,
equivalently, model uncertainty aversion being stronger
than risk aversion. Unsurprisingly, in the special case in
which the DM manifests the same attitude toward risk
and model uncertainty, the problem is reduced to the
one considered by a classical subjective expected utility
maximizer defined by representation (1). In this case,
the decision problem may be reduced to a problem
under risk.13 The great flexibility of this decision rule,
which is based on the smoothness of function h, implies
different conditions in the comparative statics analysis
of optimal abatement. In particular, one condition
needed to sign the direction of the change result-
ing from higher aversion toward model uncertainty
than toward risk is the notion of ambiguity prudence
(Gierlinger and Gollier 2008, Berger 2014). This con-
cept, which is closely related to the notion of risk
prudence introduced by Kimball (1990), corresponds
to a condition under which the individual is willing
to save more because of the presence of ambiguity.14
Equivalently, it expresses the sensitivity of the optimal
choice to the combination of model uncertainty and
13 Note also that the maxmin criterion presented in the online
supplemental material is recovered from this formulation in the
special case of infinite model uncertainty aversion.
14 Formally, an agent is said to be ambiguity prudent if the introduc-
tion of ambiguity through a mean-preserving spread in the space of
conditional second-period expected utility raises the agent’s optimal
level of saving (Berger 2014).
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risk. The notion of ambiguity prudence in this context
corresponds to decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion,
which is the analogue of the widely accepted notion of
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Formally,
the notions of constant, decreasing, and increasing
absolute ambiguity aversion are defined depending on
the monotonicity properties of the ratio −4′′4x5/4x55.
In what follows, we, respectively, use the abbreviations
CAAA, DAAA, and IAAA to denote these cases.15
Equipped with the ambiguity prudence property, which
we investigate further in the next section, we now
compare the optimal level of abatement chosen by a
decision maker under the smooth criterion with the one
chosen under classical subjective expected utility. First,
let us recall the definition of comonotonic variables
before summarizing the result in Lemma 1, which is
reminiscent of Alary et al. (2013) and Berger (2015).16
Definition 1. Consider two random variables X
and Y that are strictly monotonic transformations of a
single random variable ; that is, 4X1Y 5= 4f 451g455.
The random variables X and Y are anticomonotonic if f
is increasing and g is decreasing in  and comonotonic
if both f and g are increasing or decreasing in .
Lemma 1. Assume that model uncertainty aversion is
higher than risk aversion. In the optimal abatement model
characterized by the maximization of program (4), DAAA
(IAAA) is sufficient to raise (decrease) the optimal abatement
if Ev4C˜24a
∗
SEU 1 55 and ¡Ev4C˜24a
∗
SEU 1 55/¡a are anticomono-
tonic (comonotonic).
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
Lemma 1 tells us that the total effect on abatement
not only depends on the ambiguity prudence condition
but also on a second factor that concerns the way
the second-period expected utility and the marginal
benefit of abatement interact when different experts or
models are considered. The question of whether the
comonotonicity condition of Lemma 1 holds in practice
is not trivial. However, the intuition is relatively simple.
Consider the case of two models with different proba-
bility curves p4a15 that do not cross. When the more
pessimistic one (e.g., the one with lower Ev4C˜24a∗SEU 1 55)
15 Note that DAAA encompasses the most widely used functional
forms of power and exponential  (the former is usually referred to
as “constant relative ambiguity aversion” (CRAA) and the latter
corresponds to CAAA). It is stronger than requiring ′′′ > 0, but this
should not be surprising, given that future utility in program (4) is
represented by the  certainty equivalent of the expected utilities
rather than by its expected  valuation.
16 In a recent contribution, Millner et al. (2013) also proposed a
model of abatement with an endogenous probability in a one-period
framework similar to Alary et al. (2013). When two periods are
considered, however, the comonotonicity condition only concerns
the second period, and general conclusions may be drawn for the
more realistic cases in which the effort exerted in the first period
also reduces the ambiguity.
believes that the probability of catastrophe decreases
faster in abatement (e.g., a higher ¡Ev4C˜24a∗SEU 1 55/¡a),
the anticomonotonicity condition holds, and the condi-
tion of ambiguity prudence—stating that the DM is
more willing to invest for the future when this future
becomes more uncertain—is sufficient. In this case, it
is equivalent to saying that the disagreement across
models falls in abatement. For example, this would be
the case if experts agreed that a high level of climate
protection would give us good chances of avoiding a
climate catastrophe but disagreed on the probabilities
in the case of limited mitigation and thus higher global
warming. To gain more intuition, we now disentangle
the role of preferences from the structure of model
uncertainty and study the two effects separately.
2.1. The Ambiguity Prudence Effect
In terms of attitudes toward risk and model uncer-
tainty, the ambiguity prudence condition turns out
to be nontrivial, as is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Decision makers exhibit DAAA if and
only if their preferences toward risk, captured by function u,
and model uncertainty, captured by function h, are such that
h′′′
h′
− v
′′′
v′
≥
(
−h
′′
h′
+ v
′′
v′
)(
−h
′′
h′
− 2v
′′
v′
)
0 (7)
Similarly, a decision maker exhibits CAAA if inequality
(7) holds with an equality, and IAAA if inequality (7) is
reversed.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
Intuitively, Proposition 1 tells us that a necessary and
sufficient condition for DAAA is that the difference in
downside model uncertainty and risk aversion (the
left-hand side of (7)) is sufficiently high. To gain further
insight about this condition, consider the following
examples.
Example 1. When the isoelastic CRRA–CRMUA17
specifications with relative risk aversion parameter 
and relative model uncertainty aversion parameter ≥
 (so that the DM is ambiguity averse) are considered,
the ambiguity aversion function is given by 4U5=
41/41−55641−5U 741−5/41−5, the coefficient of absolute
ambiguity aversion is 4−5/441 −5U5, and the DM
exhibits DAAA when < 1, CAAA when = 1, and
IAAA when > 1.
17 A utility function has the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
property if it takes the form v4x5 = x1−/41 − 5, where  is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion (note that when = 1, it col-
lapses to v4x5= ln x). Constant relative model uncertainty aversion
(CRMUA) is defined similarly for function h, in the sense that
h4x5= x1−/41 −5, where  represents the coefficient of relative
model uncertainty aversion.
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Figure 1 (Color online) Different Models or Experts p4a1 5 as Functions of the Abatement Level a, Under Constant (Column A), Increasing (Column B), or
Decreasing (Column C) Degree of Model Uncertainty in Abatement
A
p (a,  ) p (a,  ) p (a, )
a
p (a, 1)
p (a, 2)
p (a, 3)
p (a, 1)
p (a, 2)
p (a, 3)
p (a, 1)
p (a, 2)
p (a, 3)
B
a
C
a
2(a ) 2(a ) 2(a )
a a a
Example 2. When the CARA-CAMUA18 specifica-
tions are used with absolute coefficients of risk aversion
and model uncertainty aversion, respectively,  and ,
the ambiguity function is 4U5= −4−U5/, so that the
DM always exhibits IAAA.
2.2. The Convergence of Agreement Effect
To study the structure of model uncertainty, let us
simplify the notation in expression (2) above, and let
w2 − L with L > 0 be the certainty equivalent con-
sumption in the second period when the economy
is hit by a catastrophe.19 Remember that in this case,
each model P describes a possible risk of second-
period consumption, which is fully characterized by
C˜24a1 5∼ 6w2 −L1p4a1 53w211−p4a1 57. An illustration
of possible different models is depicted in the first row
of Figure 1.
To further characterize the change in the optimal
abatement decision, we now define the notion of degree
of model disagreement. It is a measure of the variability
across models (or, equivalently, of the disagreement
among experts).
Definition 2. For any set of probability functions
8p4a159∈8110001n9 characterizing models 8P9∈8110001n9, the
degree of model disagreement is given by
24a5 2= Var6p4a1571
for any given level of abatement a.
18 A utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) if
it has the form v4x5= −e−x , where  is the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion. Cconstant absolute model uncertainty aversion (CAMUA)
is defined analogously, so that h4x5= −e−x , where  is the coefficient
of absolute model uncertainty aversion.
19 More precisely, this certainty equivalent is implicitly defined by∑
s∈S sv4w2 −Ls5= v4w2 −L5.
The degree of model disagreement is illustrated in
the lower row of Figure 1. As can be seen, it can be
(but is not limited to) constant (column A), increasing
(column B), or decreasing (column C) in the level
of abatement. In what follows, we will focus on the
case where the degree of model disagreement is a
monotonic function of abatement.20 We will refer to
“convergence of agreement,” a situation in which the
degree of model disagreement is decreasing. Using
this simple metric, we can now relate the results of
Lemma 1 to the structure of model uncertainty. First,
note that, conditional on the true model being P, we
can write
Ev4C˜24a
∗
SEU 155
=v4w25−p4a156v4w25−v4w2 −L57 (8)
¡Ev4C˜24a∗SEU 155
¡a
=−pa4a156v4w25−v4w2 −L571 (9)
where pa ≡ ¡p/¡a. Lemma 1 therefore tells us that a DM
exhibiting DAAA will always choose to abate more
if p4a15 and pa4a15 are anticomonotonic in , as is
the case in column C of Figure 1, for example. In this
case, the degree of model uncertainty will intuitively
be decreasing in abatement since abatement decreases
the probability of catastrophe more strongly in more
pessimistic models. The sufficient condition of Lemma 1
is, however, very restrictive, and Proposition 2 below
tells us that the comonotonicity property does not
20 Remark that this assumption is less restrictive than the one
requiring the set of models 8P9 to be monotonic in  for all levels of
abatement equivalent to the one used in Alary et al. (2013) and Berger
(2015). In particular, our assumption does not require probability
curves to not cross each other.
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necessarily have to hold for all the models considered.
Instead, a simple and weaker condition on the degree
of model disagreement can be used to determine the
direction of the change induced by ambiguity aversion:
Proposition 2. The degree of model disagreement 24a5
is decreasing ( increasing) in abatement if and only if
Cov4p4a153 pa4a1 55≤ 4≥5 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
With this intuition in mind, we can now introduce
our main result, which does not require the relatively
strong condition of comonotonicity.
Proposition 3. In the optimal abatement problem under
model uncertainty,
(i) a decision maker exhibiting CAAA always chooses to
abate more (less) than an SEU maximizer if the degree of
model disagreement decreases (increases) with abatement;
(ii) a decision maker exhibiting strict DAAA (IAAA)
always chooses to abate strictly more (less) than an SEU
maximizer if the degree of model disagreement decreases
(increases) or is constant in abatement.
This proposition tells us that if higher abatement
leads to a reduction in the degree of model disagree-
ment, a positive incentive is generated to abate more
in the first period. Intuitively, the degree of model dis-
agreement will be decreasing in abatement if abatement
on average decreases the probability of a catastrophe
more strongly in pessimistic models. This structural
effect has, however, to be added to the ambiguity
prudence effect to determine the direction of the total
change in the abatement level. Ultimately, whether
experts’ disagreement decreases in abatement, and the
extent to which the model structure effect interplays
with ambiguity prudence in determining the optimal
level of mitigation, can be determined only numerically.
In the next section we bring the model to the data and
analyze the direction and magnitude of both effects.
3. Empirical Evidence and
Expert Judgments
The question of whether the degree of model dis-
agreement is increasing or decreasing in the level of
abatement is essentially an empirical one. In this sec-
tion, we use the results of a recently published study
to assess whether the conditions obtained from our
theoretical model are met in practice. In particular, we
study separately the two effects of ambiguity prudence
and convergence of agreement we described in the
previous section.
We use the data of Zickfeld et al. (2007). Their study
presents the results from interviews with 12 leading
climate scientists about the risk of a collapse of the
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC,
also called thermohaline circulation) due to global
climate change.21 Specifically, the authors elicited the
experts’ probabilities22 that a collapse of the AMOC will
occur or will be irreversibly triggered as a function of
global mean temperature increase realized by the year
2100. These probabilities are reproduced and approxi-
mated in a least-squares sense using a power function
of the type P4T 5= k1T k2 , where T represents the change
in global mean temperature, and k1 and k2 are the
best-fit coefficients, in the upper panel of Figure 2. Note
that, for T = 01 the probability of catastrophe P4T 5 is set
to zero for all experts. As can be seen, eight experts23
assessed a nonzero probability of this catastrophic
event. For an increase of 2C in 2100 relative to 2000,
four experts assessed the probability of a collapse as
≥5%, whereas for a warming of 4C, three experts
assigned a probability of ≥40%. Finally, if the increase
in global warming reaches 6C, the probability is 90%
for two experts, ≥50% for four experts, and ≥10%
for six experts. These curves represent the different
probability functions p4a1 5 we introduced in §2, given
that the abatement of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
lowers expected global mean temperature. Although
the link between cumulative emissions and temperature
increase has been shown to be robustly described by a
linear relationship (Matthews et al. 2009, IPCC 2013),
the magnitude of the so-called carbon-climate response
describing this relationship remains uncertain. In our
framework, we have so far neglected this additional
source of uncertainty. In the online supplemental mate-
rial, we allow for different values of carbon-climate
response and show that our results are robust to this
alternative source of uncertainty.
In Figure 3, we provide the distorted probability
functions for different values of model uncertainty
aversion. Formally, this notion is defined as follows.
21 The AMOC is a major current in the Atlantic Ocean that transports
heat energy from the tropics and Southern Hemisphere toward the
North Atlantic. Changes in this ocean circulation could have an
important impact on many aspects of the global climate system,
including changes in the carbon cycle. A collapse of the AMOC is
defined in Zickfeld et al. (2007, p. 249) as a “reduction in AMOC
strength by more than 90% relative to present-day.” Such an event
may potentially have catastrophic consequences such as changes in
sea level in the North Atlantic up to 1 meter (Zickfeld et al. 2007,
Figure 7) and reductions in crop production or water availability
with consequent impacts (IPCC 2007, Table 12.4). The list of scientists
selected for this study can be found in Zickfeld et al. (2007). It includes
experts with different scientific backgrounds (observationalists,
palaeoclimatologists, modelers), geographic origins, and schools
of thought. These experts were selected based on different criteria
(authors’ knowledge of the field, review of recent publications, advice
from scientists in the field).
22 Expert elicitation is a tool for systematically gathering and pro-
jecting scientific information on complex policy problems that is
increasingly recognized to play a valuable role for informing climate
policy decisions (Kriegler et al. 2009).
23 Note that expert 5 did not answer the question.
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Figure 2 (Color online) (Upper Panel) Experts’ Probabilities as a
Function of Global Mean Temperature in 2100; (Lower Panel)
The Degree of Scientific Model Disagreement 4 25
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Definition 3. The distorted probability pˆ4a5 is the
probability that would be equivalently considered
under expected utility, and that is defined as
pˆ4a5v4w2 −L5+ 41 − pˆ4a55v4w25
= 4v h−158E4h  v−158p4a1 ˜5v4w2 −L5
+ 41 − p4a1 ˜55v4w25990 (10)
Note that for an individual exhibiting an equal atti-
tude toward risk and model uncertainty, the distorted
Figure 3 (Color online) Distorted Probabilities of the Catastrophe
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Note. Specifications: v , CRRA (= 1); and h, CRMUA ().
probability corresponds to the predictive probability of
catastrophe: p¯4a5≡ Ep4a1 ˜5. On the contrary, under
the smooth model uncertainty aversion criterion, the
DM aggregates the different models depending on the
degree of model uncertainty aversion relative to the risk
aversion and acts like an expected utility maximizer
considering only the distorted probability pˆ4a5. In par-
ticular, if aversion to model uncertainty is stronger than
that to risk, it must be that pˆ4a5≥ p¯4a5 ∀a, leading any
ambiguity-averse DM to overweight more pessimistic
models. Since estimates of the potential loss L are hard
to obtain, we follow van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw
(2014) in assuming a 20% loss of GDP. This order of
magnitude is rather speculative and is used essen-
tially for illustrative purposes in the context of climate
change, but it is based on the findings of Barro (2015),
who shows that, historically, catastrophes (defined as
losses of at least 10% of GDP) averaged approximately
20% of GDP. Finally, regarding the weights of differ-
ent experts, we consider a uniform prior distribution,
given that we do not have any information about the
“qualifications” of the different experts.24 We can now
study separately the effect resulting from the degree of
model disagreement (convergence of agreement effect)
and the one resulting from the attitude toward model
uncertainty (ambiguity prudence effect).
Let us begin with the former. The lower panel of
Figure 2 tells us that the degree of model disagreement
for the AMOC collapse is decreasing in the level of
abatement. To compute the distorted probabilities in
Figure 3, we use a utility function v of the type CRRA
with a parameter of relative risk aversion = 1 (i.e.,
log utility), and a function h of the CRMUA form, with
a model uncertainty aversion parameter . From the
properties of the CRRA–CRMUA functions discussed
above, the DM exhibits CAAA, so that there is no
ambiguity prudence effect. The total effect on abatement
can therefore be entirely attributed to the decrease in the
degree of model disagreement. For = 1, the individual
is ambiguity neutral and maximizes expected utility by
considering only the probability depicted in blue. When
= 0, the DM is ambiguity loving and seems to be
considering more optimistic experts, whereas when 
increases, more weight is attached to more pessimistic
experts, and the probability of catastrophe increases for
any fixed level of abatement. What Figure 3 indicates is
that not only is the distorted probability of catastrophe
higher when > 1, but so is the slope of the distorted
24 This view is supported by Zickfeld et al. (2007, p. 239) who
wrote “the process of choosing experts for inclusion in this study is
fundamentally different from the process of sampling to estimate
some uncertain value such as a physical quantity, or polling the
public to predict the results of an election. The route to scientific truth
is not a matter of voting. One of the outliers among the respondents
may be correct, and those who appear to be in close agreement may
all be wrong.”
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Figure 4 (Color online) (Upper Panel) Artificial Experts’ Probabilities
as a Function of Global Mean Temperature in 2100;
(Lower Panel) The Degree of Model Disagreement 4 24a55
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probability functions, therefore making abatement
marginally more desirable. This change in the marginal
benefit of abatement induces the DM to opt for a higher
abatement level.
To isolate the ambiguity prudence effect, we artifi-
cially construct three different probability laws repre-
senting experts’ assessments of the AMOC collapse
(upper panel of Figure 4). The probability laws are con-
structed in such a way that, by considering a uniform
prior over experts, an EU maximizer chooses exactly the
same amount of abatement as in the case considering
the data from the probabilities of Zickfeld et al. (2007),
presented in Figure 2. Since these probability laws are
perfectly parallel, the degree of model disagreement
24a5 is constant in abatement (lower panel of Figure 4).
The effect of higher aversion toward model uncertainty
than toward risk on optimal abatement in this case
therefore depends exclusively on the DM’s ambiguity-
prudence attitude. In particular, from our model we
know that DMs who exhibit IAAA abate less, DMs
who exibit CAAA abate exactly the same amount, and
DMs who exhibit DAAA abate more. To quantify the
importance of this effect, we present the distorted prob-
abilities with different specifications of the functions v
and h in Figure 5. We consider the CRRA–CRMUA
specification described above, spanning rather extreme
values of relative risk aversion  and model uncer-
tainty aversion . As before, when  = , the DM
acts as an expected utility maximizer and considers
Figure 5 (Color online) (Upper Panel) Distorted Probabilities of
Catastrophe for Different Specifications of v , CRRA 45, and h,
CRMUA 45; (Lower Panel) Difference 4ã4a55 Between Distorted
Probability and Probability Law Considered Under SEU
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the average probability of catastrophe, depicted in
solid blue. When model uncertainty aversion is higher
than risk aversion (> ), a DM exhibiting DAAA
(respectively, CAAA and IAAA) considers the dis-
torted probability represented by the red dotted line
(respectively, the blue dash-dotted line and brown
dashed line). The lower panel of Figure 5 shows that
the difference between the distorted probabilities and
the simple average, ã4a5 2= pˆ4a5− p¯4a5, is, respectively,
constant, decreasing, or increasing in abatement when
CAAA, DAAA, or IAAA is considered. This gives
an ambiguity-averse individual manifesting DAAA
an incentive to abate more in order to prevent the
realization of the bad state in the future, since the
absolute slope of the probability curve (and hence the
marginal benefit of abatement) is always higher in
this situation than under expected utility or under
CAAA. However, although the direction of the effect is
the same as predicted by our model, its magnitude
appears to be small, with discernible difference only for
very high values of model uncertainty aversion.25 This
provides an empirically grounded assessment of the
relative importance of the structure versus the attitude
toward model uncertainty, showing that the former
effect (namely the convergence of model agreement)
has a bigger impact on the optimal climate policy
25 It may be shown that this result of almost no ambiguity-prudence
effect is robust to a reasonable range of GDP losses.
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decision. To provide a quantitative assessment of the
combined effects of model uncertainty on optimal
abatement, we now apply our framework to a general
equilibrium model of climate change economics.
4. Quantification Using an Integrated
Assessment Model
To quantify the theoretical predictions, we implement
the model developed in this paper using the data
of §3 in the most widely used integrated assessment
model for the analysis of climate change, the DICE
model (Nordhaus 1993). The DICE (dynamic integrated
climate and economy) model is a numerical optimal
growth model à la Ramsey, which integrates emissions
and their mitigation in the production function, and
which provides climate change feedback on the econ-
omy through climate and impact modules.26 We extend
the DICE model by reformulating it as a stochastic
control problem and by implementing the endoge-
nous possibility of a climate catastrophe based on
the estimated experts’ probability functions. Section 2
in the online supplemental material provides a more
detailed description of the model. Following the expert
elicitation of Zickfeld et al. (2007), we consider the
case where the uncertainty is resolved at one single
point in time, in the year 2100. That is, after the year
2100, either the catastrophe has hit the economy, lead-
ing to the crossing of a tipping point, or not. In the
catastrophic state, an irreversible damage occurs in
that an additional 20% of baseline GDP is lost for the
remaining time horizon. This means that we extend
the DICE damage function that expresses the economic
impacts of climate change D in percent of GDP as the
following random variable:
D˜4T 5∼ 61T +2T 3 +L1p4T 531T +2T 3141−p4T 5571
(11)
where T is the change in global mean temperature
relative to the preindustrial level, and p is the prob-
ability of suffering an additional catastrophic loss L,
as given by expert .27 The term 1T +2T 3 on the
right-hand side of expression (11) represents the stan-
dard DICE damage function. For example, the default
calibration of 1 = 012 = 0000267, and 3 = 2 yields a
standard damage estimate of 5.4% of GDP for a 4.5C
temperature increase. The loss due to a catastrophic
event (L= 20%) adds to the standard damage function
and occurs with a probability that depends on the
26 See Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) and Nordhaus (2014) for a descrip-
tion of all assumptions, equations, and data used for the latest
version of the model, DICE2013R.
27 An adjustment factor of 0.7C, representing the global mean
increase in temperature between the years 1900 and 2000 (Hansen
et al. 2006), is used since the DICE standard damage function
considers 1900 as a reference for temperatures.
temperature increase attained in the year 2100. Finally,
although so far we have assumed that the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution was equal to the inverse of
the degree of relative risk aversion (an assumption that
is maintained throughout the literature; see Klibanoff
et al. 2009), we disentangle these two very different
normative characteristics of the decision maker to
obtain a more realistic representation of preferences. To
do so, we modify DICE’s utility function and adapt
the generalized model of Hayashi and Miao (2011) to
disentangle the three concepts of risk aversion, intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, and model uncertainty
aversion. As before, we represent risk aversion by the
function v and model uncertainty aversion by h. The
agent’s intertemporal welfare at time t is represented
by the following recursive form:
Wt = u−1641 −5u4ct5+u4Rt4W˜t+1 ˜455571 (12)
where u characterizes the attitude toward consumption
smoothing over time,28  is the discount factor, Ct is
the consumption at time t, and Rt4W˜t+14˜55 represents
the double certainty equivalent. We define the double
certainty equivalent as follows:
Rt4W˜t+14˜55 2= h−14Et14h  v−154Etv4W˜t+14˜55550 (13)
In this expression, Et1  is the expectation operator
taken at time t over models, and Et is the expectation
operator taken at time t over future consumption,
conditional on . For the implementation, we use a
threefold isoelastic specification of the different func-
tions:  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution,  is the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) parameter, and  is the degree of constant
relative model uncertainty aversion (CRMUA). The
main purpose of the threefold disentanglement is to
allow varying risk preferences while keeping constant
the certainty equivalent discount rate, as defined by
the Ramsey rule.
The enhanced DICE model allows us to quantify the
impact of model uncertainty aversion on abatement in
light of the insights of the theoretical model proposed
in §2. In particular, it shows how the combined effects of
ambiguity prudence and the convergence of agreement
effect impact the optimal abatement decisions. To do
so, we compute the level of additional abatement, i.e.,
the extra reduction of cumulative emissions, under
the possibility of a climate catastrophe, relative to that
in the standard version of DICE without catastrophic
28 Similar to what is proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
(1990), we consider the particular case in which u is isoelastic, with a
parameter  representing the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
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Figure 6 (Color online) Additional Abatement Based on the Modified Version of DICE with the Possibility of AMOC Collapse for Different Values of
Relative Risk Aversion 45 (Left) and Relative Model Uncertainty Aversion 45 (Right)
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climate change.29 Figure 6 illustrates the results in terms
of additional abatement realized during the period
2010–2100 for different parametrizations. For == 0
(that is, for a risk- and model-uncertainty-neutral policy
maker), the only difference with respect to the standard
DICE is the presence of catastrophe, which is evaluated
as its expected future consumption loss. In this case,
optimal abatement increases by 13.5% in the sense that
the cumulative emissions are further reduced from
3,813 to 3,301 GtCO2, as reported in Table 1.
The additional abatement rises to 15%, 23%, and
42% when both risk and model uncertainty aversions
are increased simultaneously (=) to 1, 4, and 10,
respectively (black crosses in Figure 6). This situation
of ambiguity neutrality corresponds to the Epstein–
Zin–Weil version of the model. Differentiating the
coefficients of risk aversion and model uncertainty
aversion enables us to see that the additional abatement
level is increasing in the risk aversion parameter ,
though at a decreasing rate (left panel of Figure 6).
For what concerns the model uncertainty aversion
parameter , the additional abatement level mono-
tonically increases. In terms of magnitude, the results
suggest that the effect of model uncertainty aversion is
approximately one-fourth to approximately one-half
29 Unless stated explicitly otherwise, we keep the standard specifica-
tions of the latest version of the DICE model (see Nordhaus and
Sztorc 2013, Nordhaus 2014) unaltered. This, for example, means
that the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is fixed
to = 1045 and that the pure rate of time preference equals 105% per
year. In the standard scenario without the possibility of a catastrophe,
the global temperature increase by 2100 is approximately 3.1°C, and
the global cumulative CO2 emissions, also called the cumulative
carbon budget, amount to 3,813 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2)
for the period 2010–2100 (see the last row of Table 1). We will refer
to additional abatement for any further relative reduction of this
carbon budget.
of the effect of risk aversion (as can also be inferred
from Figure 6): starting from the case of == 1 with
additional abatement of 15% of emissions, increasing
 to 10 roughly doubles the effort to 32%, whereas
increasing  to 10 increases abatement to 19%. More-
over, the results of the enhanced DICE model confirm
what we observed in the previous section concerning
the relative importance of preferences and structure of
model disagreement: since the experts’ disagreement
decreases in abatement, abatement always increases in
the degree of model uncertainty aversion, even when
≥ 1.
Table 1 provides additional details of the scenario
runs. In the third column, we report the social cost
of carbon in 2015.30 It is estimated to be $17.7 per
ton of CO2 in the standard version of DICE without
catastrophe and increases to $20.4 when the possibil-
ity of a catastrophe is taken into account in a risk-
and model-uncertainty-neutral environment. It further
increases to $27 when the relative risk and model
uncertainty aversion parameters = = 10 are consid-
ered. Additional results concerning the temperature
increase reached in 2100 are presented in the fourth
column of Table 1. As can be seen, the introduction of
a potential catastrophic climate change event reduces
the admitted global temperature increase in 2100 (com-
pared to the preindustrial level) from 3.1C in the
standard version of DICE, to 2.5C (when = = 10).
Both the risk and model uncertainty aversion param-
eters lead to a reduction of the optimal temperature
30 Put simply, this important concept measures the market price of
emissions of GHGs. More formally, the social cost of carbon at time t
is defined as the ratio of the marginal impact of emissions on welfare
over the marginal welfare value of a unit of aggregate consumption
(see Nordhaus 2014 for more details).
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Table 1 Global Cumulative Emissions for the Period 2010–2100, Social Cost of Carbon in 2015, Temperature Increases (with Respect to
Preindustrial Levels), and Average and Distorted Probabilities of Catastrophe Obtained with the Modified Version of DICE Under the
Possibility of AMOC Collapse
Cum. emissions in Additional optimal Social cost of carbon Temperature increase Average prob. of Distorted prob. of
2010–2100 (GtCO2) abatement (%) in 2015 ($/tCO2) ($) in 2100 (°C) catastrophe p¯4T ∗5 (%) catastrophe pˆ4T ∗5 (%)
= 0
= 0 3,301 1304 2004 2.91 6.6 6.6
= 1 3,244 1409 2007 2.89 6.5 6.4
= 4 3,045 2001 2108 2.82 6.2 5.7
= 10 2,634 3009 2401 2.67 5.5 3.9
= 1
= 0 3,290 1307 2005 2.91 6.5 6.6
= 1 3,230 1503 2008 2.89 6.4 6.4
= 4 3,022 2007 2109 2.81 6.1 5.7
= 10 2,585 3202 2404 2.65 5.4 4.0
= 10
= 0 3,179 1606 2101 2.87 6.4 7.3
= 1 3,096 1808 2105 2.84 6.2 7.2
= 4 2,799 2606 2302 2.73 5.8 6.5
= 10 2,195 4204 2700 2.50 4.8 4.8
Standard optimal 3,813 0 1707 3.1 0 0
version of DICE
increase.31 Finally, the two last columns of Table 1
present the average p¯4T ∗5 and distorted pˆ4T ∗5 probabil-
ities of the AMOC collapse that is ultimately admitted
by the DM. These values are computed at the optimal
temperature endogenously calculated by the model.
As expected, these probabilities are decreasing in both
 and  since the temperature is decreasing in both
parameters. We also remark that p¯4T ∗5 < pˆ4T ∗5 as long
as  > , so that the DM always overestimates the
probability of catastrophe when model uncertainty
aversion is stronger than risk aversion (and vice versa).
Overall, these results from the stochastic IAM confirm
that model uncertainty plays an important role in quan-
titative terms when the convergence of agreement effect
is important. Depending on the parametrization of
preferences, the possibility of catastrophes leads to an
additional mitigation effort of the cumulative emissions
in the baseline scenario in the range of 13%–49%.
To analyze the robustness of our results, we perform
an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the
most relevant model parameters and specifications. In
particular, we take into account a different timing of
the catastrophic event, different values for the equi-
librium climate sensitivity, different utility discount
rates, and different values of the economic losses of the
catastrophe. Although the full set of results is available
in the online supplemental material, a summary of the
results can be found in Table 2. We focus on the effect
of model uncertainty aversion, while maintaining an
31 Additional graphs concerning the social cost of carbon and the
stochastic evolution of global temperature can be found in the online
supplemental material.
intermediate value of = 4 for the parameter of risk
aversion.
Overall, the results show that the qualitative effect
of model uncertainty aversion is robust throughout
the specifications considered. For a lower value of the
economic loss from the catastrophe (10% of GDP), a
very low value of the climate sensitivity, or a com-
parable high utility discount rate of 3%, the effect
of model uncertainty is attenuated but still leads to
a notable increase in optimal abatement. If, on the
other hand, the values are set to the other side of
the spectrum, model uncertainty raises precautionary
mitigation effort significantly, and more than propor-
tionally. For example, an impact L of 30% as opposed
to 20% raises the social cost of carbon by approximately
$7/tCO2. Finally, regarding the timing of learning and
the potential occurrence of the catastrophic event, we
find that the increase in abatement is higher for earlier
occurrences and that it diminishes over time.
5. Conclusion
This paper aims at understanding and quantifying
the impact of model uncertainty aversion on optimal
abatement decisions, for the policy-relevant case of
catastrophic climate change. This attempt stems from
the recognition that, although it is now fully recognized
that the presence of these uncertainties represents an
essential datum of the climate change issue, the way
they are treated and integrated in the models used to
make predictions or to design public policies remains
unsatisfactory. By evaluating the optimal strategy for
responding to an uncertain threat, the model we present
in this paper has the advantage of treating policy
analysis like a robust risk management problem.
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Table 2 Sensitivity Analysis
Increased Cum. emissions Social cost Temperature increase
abatement for (= 10) during of carbon (= 10) (= 10)
= 0 → 10 (%) 2010–2100 (GtCO2) in 2015 ($/tCO2) ($) in 2100 (C)
Impact L
L= 10 % 103 31442 1906 2.96
L= 30 % 1908 11953 3000 2.37
Climate sensitivity
ECS = 105 204 41820 805 1.96
ECS = 405 906 11540 4205 3.16
Discount rate
prstp= 00001 1003 922 8300 1.86
prstp = 0003 303 41306 901 3.20
Time of resolutiona
2075 805 21091 2608 2.32
2100 504 21410 2302 2.41
2125 305 2616 2101 2.46
Standard version 801 21799 2302 2.73
4= 41 = 105
Notes. Differences in relative abatement are given in percentage points comparing the model run with = 10 to = 0, keeping = 4 and
everything else constant. Cumulative emissions, social cost of carbon, and temperature increases are reported for the high model
uncertainty aversion case (= 10). ECS, equilibrium climate sensitivity; prstp, initial rate of social time preference per year.
aFor these cases, cumulative emissions and temperature are reported for/until the year 2075.
In particular, we consider situations in which the
actions we take today (such as choosing the level
of abatement) affect the probability of incurring a
high-damage event (of catastrophic nature) in the
future. The selection of optimal policies in this sense is
essentially an exercise in risk management. However,
the particularity of this exercise is that it is carried out
under partial ignorance: the decision makers we study
admit that they do not know the exact relationship
between their action and the probability of catastrophe.
Rather, what the decision makers have available to help
them make a choice is a collection of models or experts’
estimates of this relationship. In contrast with purely
risky situations in which the probabilities are known,
the situations we study are therefore deeply uncertain
or ambiguous. The ambiguity results precisely from
the combination of risk and model uncertainty, and the
decision maker’s attitude toward ambiguity naturally
results from the composition of attitudes toward these
two distinct sources of uncertainty.
We compare this robust decision-making approach
with the standard expected utility approach and show
that the latter is not capable of differentiating distinct
attitudes toward different types of uncertainty: it implic-
itly treats a situation in which experts have different
dogmatic beliefs exactly the same way as a situation
of pure risk. Rather, if the policy maker is ambiguity
averse by being more sensitive to model uncertainty
than to risk, we show that the policy maker will under-
take more abatement effort if the combination of the
ambiguity prudence effect and the convergence of
the agreement effect is positive. The former condition
is directly related to a condition about the functions
representing preferences, whereas the latter is a charac-
teristic of the available expert elicitation or model data.
The intuition behind this result is that the desirabil-
ity of preventive efforts is measured not only by the
reduction in the expected damages, but also by the
value of the associated reduced uncertainties. A degree
of model disagreement that is decreasing in abatement
effort is asking for a policy limiting global warming to
relatively lower levels because it gives a precautionary
policy maker an extra incentive for a more stringent
mitigation policy, in the spirit of the precautionary
principle. Finally, in contributing to answering the need
to integrate the treatment of deep uncertainties and of
possible catastrophic events in integrated assessment
models, we apply our insights to the DICE model and
show that robust precautionary climate policies require
a significantly higher abatement level. Although the
risk-neutral consideration of a catastrophic risk leads
to a comparably low increase in abatement effort, this
increase is magnified for reasonable degrees of both
risk and model uncertainty aversion.
Although the proposed framework allows us to
generate a set of original insights, many limitations
remain. For example, we abstracted from the possi-
bility of learning. Although it is unclear how much
we can actually learn about these extreme climatic
outcomes and what the implications are of learning
on optimal abatement (IPCC 2014), several insight-
ful applications emphasizing the role of learning in
integrated assessment models with tipping elements
have been recently proposed (Rudik 2016, Lemoine and
Traeger 2014). Our framework also requires calibrating
parameters for which few estimates exist, such as the
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model uncertainty aversion, potentially limiting its
practical use. Nonetheless, we believe that the flexibil-
ity of the model uncertainty decision framework, the
results about the importance of the structure of model
uncertainty, and the simplicity of the proposed metric
of model disagreement, are widely applicable and can
be fruitfully extended to other policy objectives and
data-generating processes such as additional tipping
elements, climate engineering, technological change, or
even non-climate-related policy issues.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material to this paper is available at http://dx
.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2365.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof directly follows from Proposition 4 in Berger (2015).
The condition to observe a higher (lower) abatement due to
ambiguity aversion may be written as
E
[
′4Ev4C˜24a1 ˜555
¡Ev4C˜24a1 ˜55
¡a
]
≥ 4≤5′4−14E4Ev4C˜24a1 ˜55555E
¡Ev4C˜24a1 ˜55
¡a
0 (A1)
Analogously to the risk theory literature, it can moreover
be shown that CAAA is equivalent to ′4−14E4U˜ 555 =
E′4U˜ 5, strict DAAA is equivalent to ′4−14E4U˜ 555
< E′4U˜ 5, and strict IAAA is equivalent to ′4−14E4U˜ 555 >
E′4U˜ 5. By letting A≡ Ev4C˜24a1 ˜55 and B ≡ ¡Ev4C˜24a1 ˜55/¡a,
we can rewrite condition (A1) as Cov4′4A53B5≥ 4≤50, or
Cov4A3B5≤ 4≥50, since ′ is decreasing under ambiguity
aversion. In the case of strict DAAA, we can use the chain of
inequalities
E6
′4A5B7≥ E′4A5EB >′4−14E4A555EB1 (A2)
so that the left-hand side (LHS) of (A1) is greater than the
right-hand side (RHS) if Cov4A3B5≤ 0; in the case of strict
IAAA, we can use the chain of inequalities
E6
′4A5B7≤ E′4A5EB <′4−14E4A555EB (A3)
to show that the RHS of (A1) is greater than the LHS if
Cov4A3B5 ≥ 0. From Kimball (1951), it follows that this
covariance is negative (positive) if A and B are anticomono-
tonic (comonotonic). 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Considering the ambiguity aversion function 4U5 =
4hv−154U5, where U represents the expected utility com-
puted in the presence of risk (i.e., U ≡ Ev4x˜5), it is easy to
compute the index of absolute ambiguity aversion as
− 
′′4U5
′4U5
= −v
′h′′ −h′v′′
4v′53
v′
h′
= 1
v′
[
−h
′′
h′
+ v
′′
v′
]
1 (A4)
where, in a slight abuse of notations, we let h≡ h4v−14U55
and v ≡ v4v−14U55. As expected, this ratio is positive if
model uncertainty aversion is higher than risk aversion.
Analogously to risk theory literature, DAAA means that
−′′′4U5/′′4U5≥ −′′4U5/′4U5, which is the case if and
only if
h′′′
h′
+ 2
(−v′′
v′
)2
≥ v
′′′
v′
+
(−h′′
h′
)2
+
(−h′′
h′
)(−v′′
v′
)
0 
(A5)
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
The result is obtained by decomposing 24a5= E6p4a1 527−
p4a1 ¯52, where p¯4a5≡ Ep4a1 ˜51 and deriving this expres-
sion with respect to a: ¡24a5/¡a = 2E6p4a15pa4a157 −
2p4a1 ¯5pa4a1 ¯5= 2Cov4p4a153 pa4a1 55. 
Appendix B. Economic Impact Uncertainty
Impact (or socioeconomic) uncertainty results from our
“imperfect understanding of the impacts of climate change on
human societies and of how these societies will respond”
(Heal and Millner 2014, p. 121). In the context of our abate-
ment model, imagine that there is a scientific consensus on
the link between the probability of a catastrophic event and
the temperature increase (or abatement levels) given by a
particular probability function p4a5. Even in this far-from-
realistic situation of limited scientific uncertainty, there would
still be room for model uncertainty to play a significant
role because of the remaining uncertainty concerning the
economic impacts of a climate catastrophe. What, for example,
would be the economic loss associated with a sea level rise
of one meter? Would it be possible to construct protective
dikes to save the most vulnerable places, and if so, at what
cost? Alternatively, what would be the cost associated with
relocation and reconstruction? All of these costs correspond
to what we have called the economic loss associated with the
catastrophic event and are far from being perfectly known.32
Different experts or studies may disagree on the total impact
of a possible catastrophe, and this disagreement among
economic models may potentially affect the decision made
by a policy maker.
In our simple optimal abatement problem under impact
uncertainty about the economic impacts Ls , the second-period
expected utility for a given model P is now written as
Ev4C˜24a155=p4a5
∑
s∈S
s45v4w2 −Ls5+41−p4a55v4w251 (B1)
32 Stern (2007), for example, estimates the total loss for a high climate
change scenario with nonmarket impacts and the risk of a catastrophe
to be between 2.9% and 35.2% of GDP per capita in 2200 (see
Figure 6.5 in Stern 2007 for more details).
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where s45 denotes the probability according to expert  of
the loss Ls . The expected marginal benefit of abatement can
be obtained as
¡Ev4C˜24a1 55
¡a
= −pa4a5
[
v4w25−
∑
s∈S
s45v4w2 −Ls5
]
0 (B2)
Given that the probability of catastrophe is assumed to be
decreasing in abatement, it is clear that expressions (B1)
and (B2) will always be anticomonotonic, which leads us to
the following result.
Proposition 4. In the optimal abatement problem under model
uncertainty about impacts, an agent considering the smooth
criterion and exhibiting CAAA or DAAA always chooses to abate
more than an expected utility maximizer .
Proof. The result directly follows from Lemma 1. 
On the contrary, if the DM exhibits IAAA, it is impossible
to unambiguously sign the final effect of model uncertainty
aversion since it will depend on which of the two effects
(degree of model disagreement or ambiguity prudence)
dominates.
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